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 
Abstract— This paper proposes a new long-run network 
pricing model that can account for network users’ preference for 
security of supply when assessing their impact on network 
development costs. The new model firstly classifies load at each 
node into interruptible and uninterruptible parts according to 
their different security preference. It then seeks to examine the 
impact on the network development costs from a marginal 
increment of the two types of loads at each node. It assumes that 
interruptible loads can be interrupted under contingencies, 
whereas both loads should be satisfied under normal conditions. 
Use-of-system (UoS) charges are then calculated by translating 
the impact on network development costs into locational long-run 
network charges. Compared with the existing approach which 
assumes that consumers at the same locations are subject to the 
same security levels, the proposed approach acknowledges users’ 
different security preference, respects the reduced requirement 
on the network development costs from interruptible loads, and 
prices users’ UoS charges accordingly.  
The paper demonstrates that network charges for 
interruptible loads are cheaper than those for the uninterruptible 
loads at the same node.  The degree of the difference depends on 
the percentage of interruptible loads in the system and at the node.  
The pricing signals could incentivize prospective users to switch 
their behaviors in favor of lowering the overall network security 
requirements, and thus lowering network reinforcement costs. 
This will ultimately bring down users’ UoS charges. The 
effectiveness of the proposed approach over the basic security-
based long-run pricing model is illustrated on two networks in 
terms of charges for the two s load and the impact of load 
composition on the charges.  
 
 
Index Terms-- Network charging, security preference, 
contingency, interruptible load, uninterruptible load. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ince privatization was introduced into the UK’s electricity 
power industry in early 1990s, market forces have been 
playing a vital role in promoting competition and enhancing 
network operation and planning efficiency. In this new 
competitive environment, most networks are operated close to 
their limits, yet, network operators are required to ensure the 
same level of security at the same busbars as mandated by 
network security and quality standards [1, 2]. 
Security of supply is crucial to both network users and 
operators [3]. Higher level of security means that users’ supply 
                                                          
The authors are with the Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, 
University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, U.K. (e-mail: c.gu@bath.ac.uk; 
f.li@bath.ac.uk). 
is less likely to be interrupted under both normal and abnormal 
conditions and hence the cost due to loss of supply is lower. 
For network operators, if they opt to provide high security 
levels, they need to ensure enough investment in their 
networks to maintain sufficient available network capacity. 
This would come at high costs to them and consequently high 
electricity price to customers [4]. If, on the other hand, 
network operators choose to operate systems with lower 
security levels, thus reducing the required investment costs, 
consumers would pay for lower electricity prices but could 
suffer more frequent supply interruptions [5]. The cost of the 
supply interruptions differs from sector to sector and depends 
on the seriousness of the network contingencies and the nature, 
size and location of the interrupted loads [6]. To minimize the 
overall system costs, network operators have to strike a right 
balance between network security and network investment [7, 
8]. In arriving at the right balance, the majority of network 
operators assume that customers at the same busbars require 
the same security levels and they thus do not offer customers 
price differentiations for different security levels. This 
philosophy is thus unable to reflect the potential impact on 
networks if customers are willing to lower their security level 
of supply, partially or fully.    
Most of approaches reported in literature for charging 
based on differing security levels are for transmission systems, 
and by large they only reflect the impact on network operation 
rather than network investment [9-15]. For the first time, paper 
[9] incorporates network security into pricing for transmission 
systems from the operational aspect, in which each participant 
makes a socially optimal contingency usage assessment based 
on a forecast for potential contingent usage for its own benefits. 
The approach in [11] prices network users for their use of a 
system by simulating the change in the system’s reliability 
margin with and without the users and then allocating the costs 
relating to the decrease in reliability or the increase in 
investment cost. It brings all network users to a similar 
reliability level, thus ignoring users’ security preference. 
Papers [12-15] consider that each circuit has two functions: i) 
to allow power to flow between two nodes and, ii) to provide 
reliability benefit for maintaining system reliability. In paper 
[12], the cost of capacity use is in proportion to the sum of the 
absolute power flows caused by transactions in normal states. 
Components’ reliability margins are calculated by introducing 
a probabilistic contingency index. The disadvantage is that the 
approach is highly dependent on the number of transactions, 
which in reality is very hard to predict.  Paper [13] splits  
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circuit’s capacity-use and reliability benefit into a 80%-20% 
ratio, but no rigorous technical justifications are given. Papers 
[14-15] assign the ratio based on power flows, where capacity 
use is based on the absolute power flow under normal 
condition and the remaining capacity is for maintaining 
reliability. The calculated charges are based on the ratio 
between the two functions of each component.  For a system 
with very low utilization, the method would generate very low 
UoS charges and thus over evaluate the reliability cost. These 
papers although link network costs to system security and 
reliability but not to users’ security preference.  
In distribution networks, limited effort has been put on 
examining users’ respective impact on long-term network 
development and pricing them based on their security 
preference and . In the U.K., distribution reinforcement model 
(DRM) [16] is widely used by the majority of the distribution 
network operators (DNOs) for their high voltage (HV) and low 
voltage (LV) networks at present. The model lumps all costs 
into one, including investment and operational costs, and 
allocates the total costs according to the postage stamp 
approach for each voltage level. The model does not 
separately consider the security issue. The long-run 
incremental cost pricing (LRIC) reported in [17] uses a 
rudimentary approach to evaluate the impact of network 
security on network development costs. It assumes that all 
parallel circuits are of equal size and capacity and thus can 
only be loaded up to 50% to ensure the integrity of systems 
under N-1 contingencies. An improved security-based LRIC is 
reported in [18], which investigates the impact of security on 
network charges by conducting a full N-1 contingencies to 
determine the maximum power flow for each component, 
based on network configuration, the connection patterns of 
distributed generators (DGs) and demand. The key 
disadvantage with this approach is that it gives all users at the 
same busbars a uniform security level. It does not respect 
individual customer choice in supply reliability, nor does it 
recognize the impact to network investment costs if customers 
choose different security levels.  
 In the deregulated environment, network customers may 
prefer a higher or lower security level rather than an uniform 
level provided by network utilities [19]. In order to make 
electricity service reliability more of a private good, it is also 
necessary to provide correct signals that reflect locational and 
temporal costs and enable customers to respond to these prices 
through direct load response or through the choice of service 
levels [20]. Therefore, security-oriented charging models 
should be cost-effective not only in terms of reflecting the 
extent of the use of the network by a customer but also its 
security preference. They should be able to recognize 
customer choice for different security levels and price them 
accordingly. 
This paper proposes a new long-run network pricing model 
that respects users’ security preference when assessing their 
impact on network development costs.  The loads at all busbar 
are firstly divided into interruptible and uninterruptible 
compositions according to their choices for security. The 
interruptible part should be secured under normal conditions, 
but can be curtailed under contingencies; on the other hand, 
the uninterruptible part should be secured at all times. By 
examining the impact from the two types of loads on the future 
network investment costs over time, the long-run incremental 
cost for each node can be calculated according to the extent to 
which they defer or bring forward the investment horizons of 
network components. Compared with the previous work, the 
proposed approach can respect users’ preference for differing 
security levels. The locational charges can thus serve as 
economic messages to influence users’ behaviors in terms of: 
1) the choices for different levels of security of supply, 2) the 
connection sizes, and 3) connection sites. The approach is 
demonstrated and compared with the original security-based 
charging model in [18] on two systems in terms of charges. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
introduces the classification of load compositions from the 
security perspective. In Section III, the proposed model is 
presented. Sections IV and V demonstrate the proposed 
approach on two test systems and compare the results with 
those from the original security-based charging model. Section 
VI provides a short discussion concerning the proposed 
approach. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper. 
II.  LOAD COMPOSITION CLASSIFICATION  
In line with planning standards, all networks are designed to 
withstand credible contingencies that might affect the security 
of supply [21]. In charging models, the costs for maintaining 
network security needs to be recognized. High security level, 
however, comes at a significantly high cost to network 
development due to greater requirement for component 
redundancy. 
With regard to security level, some users might prefer 
securer supply as the consequential cost of load loss is very 
high, such as hospitals and airports; some, on the contrary, can 
tolerate lower security level if there are financial gains, e.g. 
passive appliances at home, commerce or factory, such as 
cooling, heating, washing could be interrupted for limited 
time. In line with users’ preference, demand at each busbar can 
be categorized into uninterruptible part and interruptible part, 
which have the following features:  
1) The uninterruptible load composition is the part of demand 
that should be secured during normal states and 
contingencies, regardless of whether the contingencies are 
unanticipated component failure or anticipated planned 
maintenance. This definition is also applicable to the 
prospective growth of this type of load. 
2) The interruptible load composition is the part of demand 
that should be secured under normal conditions, but can be 
interrupted under contingencies. It is also applicable to the 
future growth of this part of demand. 
The role and importance of interruptible loads has already 
been recognized in reliability analysis [22, 23] in order to 
promote network security. Most of the papers, however, focus 
on how interruptible loads could increase system reliability 
levels and reduce the level of system reserve; very few 
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investigated their impact on network investment and how to 
price them UoS charges.  
This paper proposes a new LRIC pricing model that charges 
users according to their security preference and their 
consequential impacts on network development. By adopting 
this scheme, DNOs can incentivise more flexible demand that 
can be interrupted during contingencies, thus reducing the 
need for costly network upgrading. 
III.  CHARGING FOR DIFFERENT LOAD COMPOSITIONS 
In order to more accurately recognize users’ preference for 
different security levels, both normal and contingent 
conditions should be taken into network costing and pricing 
assessment. The role of the spare capacity in a circuit to the 
two types of loads under normal and contingent conditions is 
first elaborated. The novel charging model is then presented by 
examining the impact of interruptible and uninterruptible loads 
on network components under both conditions.  
A.  Original Investment Horizon without Injections 
For a simple two-busbar system given in Fig. 1, it is 
assumed that the two circuits are identical. Each of them 
carries a normal flow of D, which is classified into two parts: 
interruptible part, Dinter, and uninterruptible part, Dunint.  
 
Bus1 Bus2
L1
L2
D
D 2D
 
Fig. 1. Layout of a two two-busbar test system. 
 
To satisfy the supply requirement, both interruptible and 
uninterruptible loads have to be secured under normal 
conditions. The investment horizon of each circuit is 
influenced by the sum of interruptible and uninterruptible load 
supported by the circuit, which can be identified by 
normnorm n
erun
n
rDDrDRC )1()()1( intint    (1) 
where, RC is the circuits’ rated capacity and r is the underlying 
load growth rate. 
Rearranging and taking logarithm of (1) gives 
)1log(
)log(log intint
r
DDRC
n erunnorm


      (2) 
On the other hand, to satisfy the supply requirement that all 
uninterruptible loads have to be secured under N-1 
contingencies, the circuits have to reserve sufficient capacity 
to accommodate potential uninterruptible loads under 
contingencies. For example, L1 needs to support its own 
uninterruptible load and the additional uninterruptible load 
normally supported by L2 in case L2 fails, while the 
interruptible loads supported by the two circuits can be 
curtailed. Hence, for the purpose of maintaining essential 
network security, the circuit’s investment horizons is 
influenced by the sum of normal and contingent 
uninterruptible loads, calculated by 
)1log(
)log(log int,
r
DRC
n
contun
cont


        (3) 
where, Dunint,cont is the maximum uninterruptible flow along the 
circuit under contingency, which is twice of Dunint in this 
example. 
To ensure the system to simultaneously satisfy the two 
supply requirements, the minimum of the two investment 
horizons defines their future reinforcement horizons.  
B.  New Investment Horizon due to Interruptible Injections 
When an interruptible injection is applied to busbar 2, its 
impact on the circuits can be reflected by examining the 
changes in the investment horizons whilst satisfying the two 
supply requirements under both normal and contingent states.   
If ΔP is the incremental flow along L1 due to the 
interruptible injection, and if the supply requirement under the 
normal condition defines the circuit’s investment horizon, the 
circuit’s new investment horizons can be determined by 
newnormnrPDRC ,)1()(         (4) 
Rearranging above formula and taking logarithm of it gives 
)1log(
)log(log
,
r
PDRC
n newnorm


       (5) 
As stated in part A, the supply requirement under 
contingencies could also define the circuit’s investment 
horizon. In this case, the additional interruptible flow that a 
circuit can carry can only be increased on top of the maximum 
contingency flow - Dunint,cont. This leads to L1’s investment 
horizon being defined by Dunint,cont , determined by 
 
)1log(
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

       (6) 
C.  New Investment Horizon due to Uninterruptible Injections 
When an uninterruptible injection is applied to busbar 2, it 
would impact the two circuits under both normal and 
contingency situations. To satisfy the supply requirement 
under the normal conditions, its influence is the same as that 
caused by an interruptible injection and thus the two circuits’ 
new horizons can be evaluated with (5). To satisfy the supply 
requirement under potential contingencies, only uninterruptible 
loads need to be secured, leading to the new reinforcement 
horizon to be determined by 
newcontn
contcontun rPDRC
,
)1()( int,       (7) 
where, ΔPcont is the incremental uninterruptible flow change 
along L1 due to the uninterruptible injection. 
Similarly, (7) can be rewritten as 
)1log(
)log(log int,
,
r
PDRC
n
contcontun
newcont


    (8) 
D.  Annual Unit Price  
Unit prices for the two load compositions are evaluated by 
assessing the changes in their supporting components’ present 
values of future reinforcement caused by the injections.  
The present value of future reinforcement of a component is 
calculated as 
 4 
nd
Cost
PV
)1( 
          (9) 
where, d is the chosen discount rate, n is its original 
reinforcement horizon without any nodal injection.  
By replacing n in (9) with its new investment horizon, nnew, 
calculated with a nodal injection, its new present value of 
future investment can be determined. Thus the difference 
between the two present values is  










nn dd
CostPV
new )1(
1
)1(
1      (10) 
The incremental cost of a network component is the change 
in the present value of future investment as a result of the 
nodal injection and annuitised over its life time, given by 
torAnnuityFacPVIC        (11) 
The LRIC charge for a studied node, i, is thereby evaluated 
by reviewing the change in the annuitized present value of 
future reinforcement cost over all its supporting components  
i
i
PI
IC
LRIC


           (12) 
where, 
iPI is the size of the injection at node i. 
E.  Implementation Procedures 
This new charging model seeks to differentiate customers’ 
differing security preference and price them according to their 
impact in both normal and contingency situations. The overall 
implementation procedures are summarized as follows.  
1) Determine the original flows under normal conditions and 
the maximum uninterruptible contingency flows under N-1 
contingencies along all components. The original normal 
flows are obtained by running power flow analysis; the 
maximum uninterruptible contingency flows are evaluated 
by removing all interruptible loads and then running 
contingency analysis.  
2) Determine incremental flows along all components due to 
interruptible and uninterruptible injections under both 
situations. Under normal conditions, the incremental flows 
due to interruptible and uninterruptible injections are 
obtained by running power flow with a tiny increment to 
each studied node. Uninterruptible increments’ effect in 
contingencies is determined by: i) removing all 
interruptible loads; ii) running incremental contingency 
flow under all contingency events with a tiny 
uninterruptible injection to each studied node; iii) finding 
out the maximum contingency flow along each component.  
3) Calculate all components’ original reinforcement horizons. 
The smaller one between (2) and (3) defines them.  
4) Calculate the new reinforcement horizons of all 
components in the cases with nodal injections with 
equations (5), (6), and (8). The ratings of components, the 
chosen load growth rate, the base case loading levels of all 
components under the two situations determined in step 1, 
and the incremental flows in both conditions derived in 
step 2 are fed into the three equations to determine them. 
With an interruptible increment connected, the new 
horizons are the smaller one between (5) and (6). For an 
uninterruptible connection, under normal cases, its impact 
on network investment is similar to the impact incurred by 
an interruptible injection, which is identified with (5). 
Under potential contingencies, its impact on network 
components is assessed with (8). Thus, the new horizons of 
its supporting components are the smaller horizon derived 
by (5) and (8).  
5) Calculate unit prices for all studied nodes. Once the 
original and new reinforcement horizons are indentified for 
each component, the unit prices for both interruptible and 
uninterruptible loads can be assessed by submitting the 
horizons obtained in steps 3) and 4) into (9)-(12).  
Unlike the original charging model which produces one 
charge at each busbar, this new method produces two nodal 
charges at each studied busbar: one is for interruptible loads 
and the other is for uninterruptible loads. The two types of 
charges are determined based on users’ security preference so 
as to influence their prospective behaviors. 
IV.  DC LOAD FLOW DEMONSTRATION ON A SMALL SYSTEM 
In this section, the two-busbar system in Fig. 1 is utilized to 
demonstrate the proposed concept. It is assumed that the two 
circuits are identical, each with a rated capacity of 45MW and 
a cost of £1596700. The discount rate of 6.9% is taken in this 
study, which is the rate of return set by the industry regulator 
in the UK for the period up to 2010. Load growth is set as the 
project long-term rate in the U.K, 1%. The proportions of 
interruptible and uninterruptible loads at busbar 2 are assumed 
to be 20% and 80% respectively. Since the two circuits are 
identical, the same proportion retains for the two circuits under 
normal conditions.   
A.   Charge Evaluation with Different Load Compositions 
Under normal conditions, each circuit can be maximally 
loaded up to its full capacity, 45MW and the system has 
90MW capability. Under N-1 contingency, only one circuit is 
available, so the maximum uninterruptible loads can be 
accommodated is 45MW. By adopting the proposed model, 
the original reinforcement horizons of the two circuits without 
any injections at busbar 2 at four loading levels are examined, 
given in Table I. 
 
TABLE I  
ORIGINAL HORIZON WITHOUT ANY INJECTION  
D 
(MW) 
Horizon driven by 
normal situation (yr) 
Horizon driven by 
contingency situation (yr) 
5 220.82 173.58 
10 151.16 103.92 
15 110.41 63.17 
20 81.50 34.26 
 
Under both normal and contingency driven situations, the 
two circuits’ reinforcement horizons become small with the 
increase in demand. At each loading level, network 
contingencies can greatly bring forward the horizons as each 
circuit needs to pick up extra contingency flows. For example, 
in 20MW loading case, the investment horizon is 81.50yrs 
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under the normal case, which is dramatically brought down to 
merely 34.26yrs under contingencies. Hence, the circuits’ 
actual reinforcement horizons are those obtained in 
contingency situations.  
 Table II provides the circuits’ new investment horizons due 
to interruptible injections and the resultant charges for 
interruptible loads at busbar 2 under the two conditions. 
Compared with normal conditions, contingencies could greatly 
reduce their new horizons especially at higher loading levels. 
For example, at 20MW loading level with 4MW interruptible 
load, the normal case investment horizon is 79.02yrs, which 
decreases to 32.71yrs under contingencies. The charges 
outlined in the last column are rather low when loading 
conditions are light, merely 1.04£/MW/yr when the 
interruptible load is 1MW. They increase exponentially with 
the rise in the loading level, soaring to 2454.14£/MW/yr with 
4MW interruptible load. 
 
TABLE II  
RESULTS FOR INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD COMPOSITION 
D 
(MW) 
Interruptible 
load (MW) 
New horizon 
driven by 
normal 
situation (yr) 
New horizon 
driven by 
contingency 
situation (yr)  
Charge 
(£/MW/yr) 
5 1 211.24 167.49 1.04 
10 2 146.26 100.83 49.18 
15 3 107.11 61.10 482.54 
20 4 79.02 32.71 2454.14 
 
The new investment horizons of the two circuits combined 
with the calculated charges with an uninterruptible injection 
applied to busbar 2 are outlined in Table III. Similarly to the 
previous cases, heavy loading cases lead to nearer horizons in 
the two conditions, with the contingency case horizons even 
smaller. The charge also increases dramatically with the rise in 
loading level, which is merely 2.48£/MW/yr when the 
uninterruptible load is 4MW but jumps to 5133.48£/MW/yr 
when the uninterruptible load grows to 16MW. By comparing 
with the charges in Table II, noticeably at each loading level 
(the proportions of interruptible and uninterruptible loads keep 
unchanged, 20% and 80% respectively), charges for 
interruptible loads are smaller than those for uninterruptible 
loads at the same bus and the difference grows with the rising 
loading conditions. 
 
TABLE III  
RESULTS FOR UNINTERRUPTIBLE LOAD COMPOSITION 
D 
(MW) 
Uninterruptible  
load (MW) 
 
New horizon 
driven by 
normal 
situation (yr) 
New horizon 
driven by 
contingency 
situation (yr)  
Charge 
(£/MW/yr) 
5 4 211.24 161.75 2.48 
10 8 146.26 97.83 107.64 
15 12 107.11 59.07 1024.64 
20 16 79.02 31.17 5133.48 
 
In order to elaborate the charge difference of the newly 
proposed and original models, the results from the original 
security-orientated LRIC approach are outlined in Table IV.  
TABLE IV  
RESULTS FROM THE ORIGINAL CHARGING MODEL 
D 
(MW) 
 
New horizon 
driven by normal 
situation (yr) 
New horizon driven 
by contingency 
situation (yr) (yr) 
Annual charge 
(£/MW/yr) 
5 151.16 141.58 8.22 
10 81.50 76.59 370.88 
15 40.75 37.45 3573.5 
20 11.84 9.36 18011.54 
 
In the original model, one circuit can only be maximally 
loaded to 22.5MW, as its capacity is halved with a 
contingency factor of 2 for catering for N-1 contingencies. In 
both normal and contingency conditions, the new horizons are 
smaller than those from the previous two cases, leading to 
higher charges. When each of them is loaded with 10MW (the 
total supported load by the two circuits is 20MW), the charge 
is 370.88£/MW/yr, approximately 370 times of the charge for 
interruptible load (1.04£/MW/yr) and 150 times of the charge 
for the uninterruptible load (2.48£/MW/yr). If each circuit is 
loaded with 20MW (the total supported load is 40MW), the 
charge difference becomes extremely wide.  
As seen from Tables II-IV, at the same loading levels and 
with the same ratio between interruptible and uninterruptible 
loads, charges for interruptible loads are always the smallest, 
followed by those for the uninterruptible loads, and the 
charges generated by the original approach are the highest. 
The different charges for interruptible and uninterruptible 
loads are able to reflect their differing security preference.   
Additionally, it should be pointed out that the maximum 
amount of load supported by the original model is only 45MW, 
as the two circuits’ rated capacity is halved by their 
contingency factors, leaving 50% capacity unused under the 
normal condition, which accounts for 99.99% of the time. The 
new model can maximally support 45MW uninterruptible load 
and a certain amount of interruptible, the size of which 
depends on the compositions of the two load types. In other 
words, the proposed model allows components to be loaded 
more heavily, thus deferring potential network reinforcement.  
B.  Charge Comparison under Different Load Compositions 
This section compares the charges from the original and 
proposed approaches with various load compositions under 
different scenarios.  
Fig. 2 compares charges for interruptible loads under four 
scenarios that have different interruptible load proportion: 
scenario 1: 50%, scenario 2: 30%, scenario 3: 10% and 
scenario 4: 0% (this is the case of the original model). As seen, 
charges increase exponentially with the rise in circuit loading 
levels in all four scenarios. In scenario 1, the charges are fairly 
low, when the interruptible load proportion is high. However, 
the decrease of its proportion tremendously propels the 
charges, as shown in scenario 3, which are greater than charges 
in both scenarios 1 and 2 at the same loading level. Scenario 4, 
in which the proportion of the interruptible load is zero, 
generates the highest charges. 
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Fig. 2. Charges for interruptible load under different scenarios.  
 
The actual maximum load at busbar 2 that the two circuits 
can support is quite different in the four scenarios. The 
maximum uninterruptible load which can be supported is 
45MW in all four cases. But the maximum supported 
interruptible load diversifies: scenario 1:  45MW, scenario 2: 
19.3MW, scenario 3: 6MW, and scenario 4: 0MW. It is 
because less spare capacity is available to interruptible loads 
with the rising proportion of uninterruptible loads. 
 Charge comparison for uninterruptible load in the 
foregoing four scenarios is presented in Fig. 3.  The lines show 
quit similar patterns to those in Fig. 2: charges increase 
exponentially with the increase in loading levels and the 
increasing proportion of uninterruptible load. Compared with 
the results from the original model in scenario 4, charges from 
the other three scenarios are fairly small.  
  
 
Fig. 3. Charges for uninterruptible load under different scenarios.  
 
Fig. 4 carries out the charge comparison for interruptible 
and uninterruptible loads in two scenarios: scenario 1: 40% 
interruptible load and 60% uninterruptible load, and scenario 
2: 20% interruptible load and 80% uninterruptible load. In 
both scenarios, the charges for the uninterruptible loads are 
higher than those for the interruptible load at the same loading 
levels. One noticeable point is that charges for the interruptible 
load in scenario 2 are even higher than both the two types of 
charges in scenario 1 at the same loading conditions. It is 
because that less circuit capacity is available due to much of it 
reserved for uninterruptible loads.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Charges comparison under two different scenarios. 
 
How customers make their security preference depends on 
the magnitude of the difference between the financial gain 
from lower security levels and the consequential financial and 
social costs from potential interruptions. For risk adverse 
customers, they would look for cost-saving opportunities with 
their passive loads, for example heating, cooling, white goods, 
electric vehicles, etc.   
Based on this simple example, it can be said that the 
proposed charging concept based on the division of loads can 
effectively differentiate the differing security levels required 
by network customers. Moreover, it can bring down charges 
dramatically in all loading conditions for both interruptible and 
uninterruptible loads, especially at higher loading levels. 
Furthermore, the proposed model allows more interruptible 
loads to be accommodated when the same size of 
uninterruptible loads are met, the amount of which depends on 
the proportion of the two types of loads.  
V.  A PRACTICAL NETWORK DEMONSTRATION 
In this section, the proposed pricing model is demonstrated 
and compared with the original model on a practical grid 
supply point (GSP) area taken from the UK distribution 
networks, given in Fig. 5. The GSP network has three voltage 
levels, 66kV, 22kV, and 11kV, consisting of 11 circuits, 9 
transformers, 6 loads and 1 generator.  
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Fig. 5. A grid supply point area test system.  
 
In this example, the proportions of interruptible and 
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uninterruptible loads are also assumed to be 20% and 80%. 
The discount rate and load growth rates are the same as those 
used in section IV, 6.9% and 1% respectively. 
All branches’ rated capacity is provided in Table V. Here, 
the circuit No.11 is not taken into consideration as it is owned 
by the generator connected to busbar 1005. 
 
TABLE V 
CAPACITY OF ALL BRANCHES 
Branch No. 
Capacity 
(MVA) 
Branch No. 
Capacity 
(MVA) 
L1 49.73 L12 28.75 
L2 49.70 L13 28.75 
L3 54.87 L14 40.00 
L4 54.87 L15 40.00 
L5 61.16 L16 31.25 
L6 36.58 L17 31.25 
L7 23.78 L18 40.00 
L8 19.09 L19 40.00 
L9 19.09 L20 28.75 
L10 36.20 L21 28.75 
A.  Charge Evaluation 
To assist analysis, Fig. 6 depicts all branches’ utilization 
levels. As seen, the most heavily loaded circuit is line L4 
linking busses 1008 and 1006. Line 3 and transformers 12-17 
also have relatively high loading levels.  
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Fig. 6. Branch utilization levels.  
 
In order to elaborate the impact from interruptible and 
uninterruptible loads on network components, Fig. 7 depicts 
the changes in the reinforcement horizons of transforms and 
circuits supporting busbar 1003. For each branch, the first two 
bars represent their original reinforcement horizons without 
any injections (the reason for putting two identical bars here is 
to illustrate and compare the different impact on investment 
horizons from interruptible and uninterruptible injections). As 
seen, L5 has the largest original investment horizon, 
approximately 91yrs, and L3 and L4 have the smallest around 
37yrs. The transposed “T” within each bar signifies how an 
injection at busbar 1003 brings forward or delays the 
reinforcement horizons from the original values. The 
transposed “T” in the first bar for each branch represents to 
what extent an interruptible injection brings down the 
reinforcement horizons, whilst the transposed “T” in the 
second bar for each branch represents how an uninterruptible 
injection would affect the horizons. Obviously, an 
uninterruptible injection brings forward branches’ 
reinforcement horizons even closer compared with an 
interruptible injection of the same size.  
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Fig.7. The comparison of components’ investment horizons. 
 
The computed charges for the two types of loads at all load 
busbars are provided in Table VI. Busbar 1003 has the biggest 
charges: 3.11£/kW/yr for interruptible loads and 6.361£/kW/yr 
for uninterruptible loads. It is because their supporting 
branches, No. 3-5 and 14-15, are all relatively heavily loaded. 
The smallest charges appear at busbar 1013, 0.19£/kW/yr for 
interruptible loads and 0.47£/kW/yr for uninterruptible loads, 
as their supporting branches are fairly lightly loaded.  
 
 TABLE VI 
 CHARGES FROM THE PROPOSED MODEL (£/KW/YR) 
Charge type 1001 1003 1006 1007 1009 1013 
For interruptible 
load 
0.61 3.11 2.52 0.32 0.27 0.19 
For uninterruptible 
load 
1.98 6.36 5.96 0.69 0.62 0.47 
B.  Comparison with the Original Model 
This part compares charges for interruptible and 
uninterruptible loads from the proposed approach with those 
generated by the original model. The original LRIC model 
generates one charge for each busbar and does not differentiate 
customers’ security preference. In order to withstand network 
contingencies, it reshapes components’ ratings with their 
contingency factors, producing the maximum available 
capacity (MAC), given in Table VII.  
 
TABLE VII 
CONTINGENCY FACTOR AND MAC OF ALL COMPONENTS 
No. 
Contingency 
factor 
MAC 
(MVA) 
No. 
Contingency 
factor 
MAC 
(MVA) 
L1 1.99 24.95 L12 2.05 14.04 
L2 2.01 24.71 L13 2.05 14.04 
L3 2.05 26.77 L14 2.04 19.59 
L4 1.98 27.66 L15 2.07 19.33 
L5 3.77 16.21 L16 1.94 16.08 
L6 2.04 17.95 L17 2.11 14.78 
L7 1.93 12.32 L18 2.00 19.97 
L8 2.05 9.31 L19 2.04 19.65 
L9 2.05 9.30 L20 2.02 14.21 
L10 2.07 17.49 L21 2.03 14.19 
 
Bigger contingency factors indicate more of components’ 
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rated capacity reserved for catering for contingencies. As 
noticed, circuit No.5 has the maximum contingency factor, 
3.77, which consequently reduces its rating from 61.16MVA 
down to merely 16.21MVA. The ratings of other branches are 
also brought down in proportion to their contingency factors. 
The third bar for each branch in Fig. 7 depicts the 
investment horizons of the components supporting loads at 
busbar 1003 evaluated with the original model. Similarly, the 
transposed “T” in the bars represents to what extent a nodal 
injection at busbar 1003 would bring forward their horizons. 
Compared with the other two bars of each branch, the 
reinforcement horizons from the old model are all smaller. The 
biggest is 68yrs for L5, which is 91yrs in the new model; the 
horizons of L3 and L4 are merely 15yrs, which are 37yrs 
computed in the proposed model. The transposed “T” signifies 
that the horizons are slightly brought down by an injection at 
busbar 1003, which are smaller compared with the effects by 
the interruptible and uninterruptible injections at the same bus.   
The calculated charges from the original model and their 
times of the charges in Table VI are provided in Table VIII. 
As seen, the charges here at the same busbar are all greater. 
The highest is 19.44£/kW/yr at busbar 1003, which is 3.06 
times of the charge for the uninterruptible loads and 6.25 times 
of the charge for the interruptible loads at that busbar. The 
lowest charge is 0.89£/kW/yr at busbar 1013, but it is still 
rather greater than the charges for interruptible and 
uninterruptible loads at the same busbar in Table VI. 
 
TABLE VIII  
 CHARGES FROM THE ORIGINAL CHARGING MODEL AND COMPARIOSN WITH THE 
CHARGES FOR INTERRUTIBLE AND UNINTERRUPTIBLE LOADS (£/KW/YR) 
Bus No. 1001 1003 1006 1007 1009 1013 
Charge 3.87 19.44 17.43 1.68 1.53 0.89 
Time of 
interruptible  
load charges 
6.34 6.25 6.92 5.25 5.67 4.68 
Time of 
uninterruptible 
load charges 
1.95 3.06 2.92 2.43 2.47 1.89 
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Fig. 8. The charge comparison between the two approaches.  
 
Fig.8 graphically compares the nodal charges provided in 
Tables VI and VIII. The charges vary from one busbar to 
another, depending on their locations in the network. At the 
same busbars, charges for interruptible loads are lower than 
those for uninterruptible loads, indicating the charges can 
effectively differentiate and reflect their different security 
preference. Further, these charges are smaller than those from 
the original model at the same busbars, but they still maintain 
the original charge relativity. The locational security-oriented 
charges are able to reflect and influence prospective users’ 
behaviors in favor of both network efficiency and security. 
VI.  DISCUSSION  
This new approach provides cost-reflective network charges 
that link network investment requirement with the extent of the 
use of the system by network users and their preference of 
security levels. The resultant charges encourage diversified 
security levels of supply, which benefit network operators 
from reduced investment requirement and network users from 
lower charges. It should be pointed out that the proportion 
between the interruptible and uninterruptible loads is crucial in 
this model for determining the two types of charges. Although 
users can reduce their UoS charges by increasing the 
proportion of their interruptible loads, they do need to 
understand the consequential costs due to supply interruptions. 
How customers value the costs of energy loss due to an 
interruptible load scheme could vary dramatically, depending 
on many factors such as their types, i.e. residential, 
commercial, or industrial, types of commerce and industry, 
their locations, their interruption durations and consequential 
social and economic costs if the unlikely events do occur.  It is 
thus essential for network customers to consider the potential 
costs before they determine their preference for different 
security levels.  
At this stage, we expect most customers are risk aversive 
unless their UoS charges are increased by significant level with 
more cost-reflective charges. For majority of customers, we do 
expect them to be risk adverse and we expect them to find 
interruptible opportunities with their passive loads, such as 
heating, cooling and washing. By interrupting these loads, it 
neither degrades customers’ quality of life nor adversely 
impact on the operation of business and commerce. In the 
future, we will envisage that customers can be more risk 
taking, especially for those who have to pay for high network 
charges. They may also consider shedding some of their active 
loads in addition to their passive loads in return for greater 
financial gains. Their security preference will have to be based 
on a proper risk assessment, evaluating the risks from network 
component failure, the likely social and financial costs that 
energy loss may bring, versus financial benefits they will earn 
from committing interruptible loads. 
 It should be pointed out that the proposed approach still 
follows the deterministic approach to reflect security standard, 
which might produce conservative results. Hence, it could be 
improved by including the failure probabilities of network 
contingencies while curtailing interruptible loads so as to 
reflect the stochastic nature of systems. Further, the scope of 
this research might also be expanded through using customers’ 
utility functions to project the dynamic interactions between 
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network charges and customers’ responses over time. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
A novel charging methodology that can account for users’ 
different security preference in distribution networks is 
proposed in this paper. It works by dividing the load at each 
busbar into interruptible and uninterruptible parts and pricing 
them accordingly. Based on the extensive analysis, the 
following observations can be reached: 
1) The new approach addresses the network security issue in 
network pricing through close examination of different 
users’ security preference on network components’ long-
term reinforcement requirement. It differentiates users’ 
security preference by dividing them into interruptible and 
uninterruptible parts rather than delivering the same 
security levels for all. Charges are evaluated and levied on 
interruptible and uninterruptible loads based on their 
impact on network investment under both normal and 
contingency circumstances.  
2) As demonstrated in the examples, marginal prices for both 
interruptible and uninterruptable loads are significantly 
reduced compared with those from the original LRIC 
model. At the same loading levels and with the same load 
compositions, charges for the interruptible loads are 
significantly lower compared with those for the 
uninterruptible loads as their security levels are relatively 
low, but both of them are smaller than charges produced by 
the original model. The resultant locational charges can 
influence the potential energy use behaviors of network 
users for overall network efficiency. They are financially 
rewarded if they choose a lower security level and thus 
reduce the otherwise needed network investment, but they 
have to weigh the financial gain from a lower security level 
with the consequential costs from potential energy loss. 
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